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The Envelope, Please: Problems and
Proposals for Electronic Mail
Surveillance
The King hath note of all that they intend,
By interception which they dream not of.1
Introduction
Consider the envelope, and what it represents in twentieth century
America. Perhaps of primary importance is the envelope's two-faceted
role in the posting of mail. It provides a convenient display of necessary
information for the letter's delivery, and cloaks the letter's contents from
all but the recipient. Utility aside, an envelope may symbolize the cere-
mony of unveiling a secret, as when a ritualistic request for "The envel-
ope, please" creates the usual suspense. An envelope may evoke
sentiment, whether romantically sealed with a kiss or ominously ad-
dressed with pasted letters and numbers cut from newsprint. It is diffi-
cult to imagine a system of correspondence without the folded piece of
paper that comprises the physical envelope. But advances in electronic
communications portend the demise of the physical envelope and have
offered no conceptual equivalent pertaining to electronic mail. A serious
practical problem has emerged: how can the electronic letter display
"envelope" information without betraying its contents?
Electronic mail is the transmission of letters and messages among
computers via telephone lines.2 The advent of computers in offices and
homes has made the electronically sent message a practical alternative to
manually delivered mail.3 Electronic mail entails instantaneous delivery
of an electronic message to a recipient's electronic mailbox, 4 avoiding the
tedious delay inherent in manual mail delivery.5 Electronic delivery of
messages also provides benefits unavailable with telephone communica-
tion: a recipient need not be present to receive the entire message; a
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF HENRY V, Act II, Scene 2, at 49 (Harbage ed. 1972).
2. L. TRUDELL, OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC MAIL 10 (1984).
3. I. MAYER, THE ELECTRONIC MAILBOX 29-31 (1985); Gerofsky, Electronic Message
Transmission to the Home: Potential Federal Regulatory Conflicts: Congressional Action
Needed, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305 (1981).
4. The "mailbox" may be the recipient's computer terminal, or a file within an electronic
mail agency's host computer, depending on the form of electronic mail in use. See infra notes
25-36 and accompanying text.
5. I. MAYER, supra note 3, at 30-31.
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message may be sent to multiple recipients simultaneously; and a recipi-
ent may print the message with a printer.6 Electronic mail services have
flourished because of these advantages, and an increasing number of busi-
nesses and home computer users rely on electronic mail to send and re-
ceive correspondence.7
Telephone calls, letters, and electronic mail leave trails of logistical
information such as phone numbers dialed, postmarks, and return ad-
dresses. Various procedures permit governmental access to these data for
use in law enforcement efforts. One such procedure, the mail cover, al-
lows law enforcement agents to collect information displayed by the en-
velopes of letters. Pursuant to the mail cover procedure,' agents may ask
the Chief Postal Inspector to compile all information on the outside of a
suspect's mail into a record for use by the agents.9 Since information
displayed by an envelope is not an interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment, investigative agents may apply mail cover without ob-
taining a search warrant.10
Increasing reliance on electronic mail suggests that an electronic
mail cover may be useful for law enforcement purposes." This Note
discusses the procedural and constitutional complications attendant to
defining and regulating electronic mail cover. First, the Note outlines
the development of electronic communications, including electronic
mail, and identifies methods which are used to monitor communications.
Second, it presents the constitutional analysis which distinguishes a gov-
ernmental search from a governmental surveillance, and examines the
application of this analysis to specific techniques used by government
agents to monitor communications. After applying this analysis to elec-
tronic mail surveillance, this Note suggests that electronic mail cover
should be defined and regulated to prevent governmental misuse, and
submits a two-part proposal for electronic mail surveillance. Finally,
6. Id. at 15-17. See also Rodgers, Legal Communications Network NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16,
1984, at 14, col. 1, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAVYERS ON LINE: ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN THE USE OF TELECOMPUTER COMMUNICATION 114-15 (1986) [hereinafter
LAWYERS ON LINE]; Couric, Electronic Mail Means Instant Delivery, 71 A.B.A. J. 96 (1985),
reprinted in LAWYERS ON LINE, supra, at 137-39.
7. "Industry sources estimate that five million Americans now use electronic mail, either
through the commercial networks operated by such firms as MCI, GTE Telenet and Dialcom
or through corporate networks that link geographically dispersed divisions by telephone lines
and computer terminals." Tyler, Electronic Messages and Privacy Rights, Wash. Post, Jan. 20,
1986, at A17, col. 1. These 5 million Americans generate approximately 250 million messages
annually. Id. See also Gerofsky, supra note 3, at 305.
8. The mail cover is authorized and regulated by 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (1986). See infra
notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
9. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c), (d) (1986).
10. See infra notes 86-94 & 108-117 and accompanying text.
11. See Webster, Sophisticated Surveillance-Intolerable Intrusion or Prudent Protection?,
63 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 353, 364 (1985), for a discussion on the need for electronic surveillance
procedures which provide police with proper investigative power to ensure public safety.
this Note discusses constitutional problems likely to arise if an increas-
ingly powerful surveillance device-electronic mail cover-persists unre-
strained by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
I. Electronic Mail Communication
A. The Historical Development of Communications in the United States
The diversity and accessibility of modem communications methods
reflect a precedent in the United States for developing intranational and
international communications. The importance of providing effective
correspondence to early Americans was duly noted by Alexis de Toc-
queville, who observed that the strength and success of a general govern-
ment in the United States depended largely on "that great instrument of
intercourse," the post. 12 Failure to construct and maintain postal roads
would induce mutual estrangement among the physically scattered colo-
nists, crippling the emergence of federal power.3 The early Americans
did not succumb to physical isolation, however, and instead built postal
roads and steamboats to facilitate national delivery of the mails."4
The zeal of early Americans for maintaining and improving the post
has been sustained in the twentieth century, and has produced a vast
array of communications techniques. One of the first contributors to the
array, Samuel Morse, after discovering a method to communicate via
electricity, introduced his telegraph in 1836.15 By 1844, refinement of
Morse's model provided nearly instantaneous communication between
two cities.16 The success of the telegraph was bolstered by the invention
of a "harmonic telegraph," by which a wire could carry various musical
pitches at once." The harmonic telegraph was a prototype for a device
which transmitted multiple messages over a single telegraph wire.18 Pop-
ular demand for telegraph communication sparked the invention of the
telephone in 1876,19 and radio signal transmission in 1895 provided the
first wireless telegraph.20
The 1920's and 1930's witnessed the spread of telephones and radios
into American homes,21 followed by "the dawn of the television era" in
12. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 404-05 (Bowen rev. 1945). De
Tocqueville marvelled at the American propensity for building post roads in unsettled areas.
Id. at 405 n.79.
13. Id. at 404-06.
14. Id. at 405 n.80.
15. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 55-56 (1981).
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 89.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 90.
20. R. THOMAS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR THE EXECUTiVE 3 (1984).
21. Id. at 1-5.
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the 1950's. 22 Technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
have coalesced into a sophisticated, interwoven telecommunications envi-
ronment.23 The transmission of vocal and electronic data via telephone
networks and satellites enables instantaneous exchange of information
around the world. 4
B. Electronic Mail
One method of exchanging information rapidly--electronic mail-
uses computers and telephone lines to transmit correspondence. 25 Elec-
tronic mail represents a synthesis of written correspondence and telecom-
munications.26 There are two basic arrangements which provide for
sending mail electronically. One method links the correspondents' com-
puters through telephone lines which transmit messages directly among
computers and correspondents. This arrangement requires that each
electronic correspondent have access to a computer with a word proces-
sor,27 modem,28 and communications software to orchestrate the trans-
22. Wilson, The Pay Cable TV-Sports Broadcasting Nexus, 8 COMM. & LAW 43, 45
(1986). It is currently estimated that 98% of American homes have telelision sets. TV of the
Future at D.C. Preview, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 10, 1987, at 58, col. 1.
23. R. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 3. See also Geller & Brotman, Electronic Alternatives to
Postal Service, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE
1980's, at 320-22 (G. Robinson ed. 1978) [hereinafter COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW].
24. Telephone networks permit electronic communication via narrowband transmission.
This provides the means of electronic mail arrangements currently in use. A different form of
electronic mail is provided by the broadband transmission of satellites. One satellite system in
development will provide two-way voice, data, and image service through small antennas lo-
cated on the subscriber's premises. This Note does not address the consequences of surveil-
lance of broadband transmission since it is not currently cost effective compared to the earth-
bound economy provided by narrowband (telephone line) transmission. R. THOMAS, supra
note 20, at 118-19. For a discussion of probable future additions to the telecommunications
array, see id. at 113-22.
25. Detailed explanations of electronic mail are provided by I. MAYER, supra note 3, and
L. TRUDELL, supra note 2.
26. The advantages of electronic mail are numerous. See generally LAWYERS ON LINE,
supra note 6, at 114-15. For a discussion of the usefulness of electronic message transmission
within a law office, see id. at 137-39. One particular electronic message system-ABA/NET--
offers an electronic mail network for lawyers which allows the transmission of an electronic
message among subscribing offices across the country within 15 minutes. For a discussion of
the ABA/NET facility, see Shuey, The Expansion of Telecommunications in the Law Office, 14
COLO. LAW. 1419, 1419-20 (1985).
27. A word processor is a computer program which provides the capacity to write at the
computer, and to save, edit, and print the document. See R. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 91; see
also J. DEKEN, THE ELECTRONIC COTTAGE 333-35 (1980).
28. A modem is a device which enables the transmission of electronic data among com-
puters using telephone lines. R. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 67. For an explanation of the
technology by which telephone lines transmit computer data, see G. BROCK, supra note 15, at
266-68.
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mission of messages among the computers. 29  The sender 30 types a
message (the "letter") into the computer and specifies the recipient.31
The communications software links the sender's terminal directly to the
recipient's terminal over telephone lines accessed by each correspon-
dent's modem.32 The recipient need not be present to receive the
message; the software can record the full communication to be read
subsequently.33
In the alternative electronic mail arrangement, a correspondent sub-
scribes to the services provided by an electronic mail agency. 34 Equip-
ment necessary for this communication includes a computer and word
processor, telephone, modem, and a subscription to an electronic mail
service. The electronic mail service provides a central computer which
holds electronic messages en route between correspondents. The sender
types a message into the word processor, indicating the letter's destina-
tion, and the modem transmits the message over a phone line to the elec-
tronic mail agency's host computer. There the message may be directly
routed to the addressee's computer or held until the addressee electroni-
cally collects the message from the host computer.35 Some services will
print the electronic message and send it off via the United States Postal
29. For example, MCI Corporation markets a computer-to-computer electronic mail sys-
tem which enables the sender to type a message at her computer and transmit it directly to
another registered MCI Mail user. Elman, Mail Messaging's Sticky Legal Issues, PERSONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL, vol. 2, no. 3, at 30 (1984), reprinted in LAWYERS ON LINE, supra note 6,
at 127.
30. The distinction between "sender" and "recipient" blurs in some electronic mail ar-
rangements. For example, the ostensible sender may be calling to retrieve mail from another's
computer. Or electronic mail may be sent and received in a single telephone transmission in
which the caller deposits her message and picks up the message left by another correspondent.
The form of delivery and pick up depends on the options provided by the communications
software, and the arrangement selected by the correspondents. For a detailed survey of the
variety of electronic mail configurations, see I. MAYER, supra note 3, at 49-153.
31. There may be multiple recipients to whom the message is sent simultaneously. LAW-
YERS ON LINE, supra note 6, at 138.
32. Id.
33. Gupta, Living in a Legal Village, BARRISTER, Winter 1984, at 64, reprinted in LAW-
YERS ON LINE, supra note 6, at 126.
34. A representative electronic mail agency service is that offered by MCI Corporation.
The service provides a depository for electronic mail, which computer users may use to com-
municate and transmit text over the phone between computers. The sender calls the service
and places the message at any time of day or night in MCI's central computer, where it is
stored until the recipient retrieves it. LAWYERS ON LINE, supra note 6, at 127. Other commu-
nications carriers offering electronic mail services are: Tymshare (OnTyme), GTE Telenet
(Telemail), ITT (DialCom), CompuServe, and The Source. L. TRUDELL, supra note 2, at 53.
35. The recipient picks up her mail by connecting with the mail service through her com-
puter, modem, and identification number. She may display the message on her terminal or
print it on a printer. L. TRUDELL, supra note 2, at 18-19. Some services offer arrangements
whereby a subscriber may send an electronic message to the agency, where it is then printed,
put into an envelope, and delivered by the United States Postal Service (or private mail carrier)
to the recipient. LAWYERS ON LINE, supra note 6, at 139.
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Service, which facilitates sending electronic messages to recipients who
do not have electronic mail capacity. If the recipient is not an electronic
mail user, delivery of out-of-town correspondence is nonetheless expe-
dited because the sender's message is instantaneously transmitted to the
host computer closest to the letter's destination, where it may be printed
for pick up by or delivery to the recipient.3 6
Each electronic mail arrangement has advantages and idiosyncra-
cies. Directly transmitted electronic mail ("terminal-to-terminal" mail) is
instantly deliverable, but requires both correspondents to have access to
electronic mail equipment and compatible electronic mail software. In
contrast, a recipient of electronic mail sent through an agency ("termi-
nal-via-agent" mail) does not need electronic mail equipment, since the
agency may print the electronically received message and provide for de-
livery or pick-up. Cost is an additional consideration. 7 Permutations of
these two arrangements are possible," but the variations are based on
either a terminal-to-terminal or a terminal-via-agent set-up. 9
II. Techniques and Procedures for Monitoring Communications
Advances in technology which have facilitated the convenient, effi-
cient exchange of information have concurrently produced sophisticated
methods for monitoring the exchange of information.' The assortment
of methods employed by government agents to watch a suspect's commu-
36. LAWYERS ON LINE, supra note 6, at 138-39.
37. There are many rapidly changing variables which affect the cost of an electronic mail
arrangement. For both types of electronic mail, these variables include the cost of the com-
puter equipment, word processor, and modem. Direct electronic mail requires purchase of a
communications software package; indirectly transmitted mail requires subscription to an elec-
tronic mail agency. Both forms of electronic mail entail transmission of data over telephone
lines, and the cost to use phone lines to transmit electronic data is calculated similarly to
conventional phone use: length of communication and distance are controlling. For electronic
mail sent via agency, costs increase if the recipient is not a subscriber, and vary according to
whether the United States Postal Service, Western Union, or other private delivery services are
involved. Id. See also I. MAYER, supra note 3, at 31-39.
38. For example, a correspondent may use her computer to transmit a message to a telex
service, which forwards the message to the recipient by teletype. I. MAYER, supra note 3, at
16-17. Or a facsimile service may be used by one correspondent, whereby a printed report is
electronically photocopied and transmitted over phone lines to an electronic mail recipient.
For an explanation of facsimile and its integration with electronic mail transmission, see L.
TRUDELL, supra note 2, at 137-39.
39. It is possible to send electronic mail through satellite hookups, using broadband trans-
mission, rather than through narrowband transmission provided by telephone networks. Satel-
lite transmission, however, requires equipment which ordinarily is unnecessarily expensive and
elaborate for the average electronic mail user. See supra note 24.
40. For a brief listing and explanation of a variety of electronic surveillance techniques
which have emerged, see Landever, Electronic Surveillance, Computery, and the Fourth
Amendment-The New Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination of Doc-
trine, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 597, 602 (1984).
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nication mirrors the assorted mediums of communication. Governmen-
tal monitoring of a communication may occur at two levels: intercepting
a communication's message, or acquiring information as to its logistics.
The following survey of investigative techniques illustrates that the dis-
tinction between content and logistics creates different procedures appli-
cable to a single communication.
A. Monitoring Mailed Communications
Letters and other mailed material contain written information
which may interest law enforcement agents in their surveillance of com-
munications. A posted letter's envelope supplies information needed for
delivery and enfolds the letter's message. Two ways to monitor mail re-
sult: collection of data from the envelope, and collection of data from the
letter itself. There is no specific method which permits law enforcement
agents to open mailed material and record its content. Instead, since
monitoring the content of mail comprises a governmental search,41 the
pertinent procedure is supplied by the fourth amendment search warrant
requirement: police must show probable cause for suspecting the subject
of the search, and must specifically describe the thing to be searched.42
The warrant requirement severely inhibits substantive mail searches, but
mail search may be used by police under circumstances which satisfy the
Fourth Amendment's procedural requirements.
Although no specific procedure governs the search of a letter's con-
tent, there is a defined method which regulates governmental access to a
letter's envelope information: the mail cover. Law enforcement agents
may use mail cover to collect all information discernible from the outside
of a suspect's mail.43 The Chief Postal Inspector's statutory authority to
compile such a record' is circumscribed by the requirement that the
41. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court disallowed governmental opening of first
class mail without a search warrant:
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be
opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are sub-
jected to search in one's own household.
Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
43. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c)(1) (1986):
"Mail cover" is the process by which a record is made of any data appearing on the
outside cover of any class of mail matter ... in order to obtain information in the
interest of (i) protecting the national security, (ii) locating a fugitive, or (iii) ob-
taining evidence of commission or attempted commission of a crime.
44. The statutory scheme authorizes the Chief Postal Inspector, or her designee, to order
mail covers:
When written request is received from any law enforcement agency wherein the re-
questing authority stipulates and specifies the reasonable grounds that exist which
demonstrate the mail cover is necessary to (A) protect the national security, (B) lo-
Winter 1987]
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requesting agency apprise the Postal Inspector of a legitimate reason to
institute the surveillance.4 1 Information obtainable pursuant to mail
cover is only that which appears on the envelope or covering of the sus-
pect's mail; government agents may not open the mail.46 Mail cover sur-
veillance initially may be applied for up to thirty days.47 This period
may be extended upon the request of law enforcement agents, after show-
ing the Postal Inspector that the original reason for the surveillance
remains.48
B. Monitoring Telephone Communications
Governmental monitoring of spoken telephone communication may
take two forms: surveillance of the logistics of a telephone connection, or
interception of a conversation's content. Access to a conversation's con-
tent is effected with a wiretap, which directly intercepts the transmission
of telephone communication from phone lines.49 Explicit regulation of
governmental wiretapping is codified in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,1° which requires police to obtain a search war-
rant prior to installing a wiretap.51
There are several techniques available to law enforcement agents
which provide surveillance of the logistics of a telephone connection.
Pursuant to one technique, law enforcement agents may examine records
maintained by telephone companies for billing purposes. 2 This informa-
tion is needed to calculate long distance (toll) call charges; the records
list the long distance numbers dialed, what time the calls were placed,
and the length of the calls.53 When law enforcement agents are inter-
ested in a suspect's local phone usage, which may not have been recorded
by the suspect's phone company, surveillance of those calls may be im-
plemented with electronic devices. One such device is the pen register.54
cate a fugitive, or (C) obtain information regarding the commission or attempted
commission of a crime.
Id. at § 233.3(d)(2)(ii).
45. No showing of probable cause is required. Id.
46. "No person in the Postal Service ... may break or permit breaking of the seal of any
matter mailed as first-class mail without a search warrant." Id. at § 233.3(g)(1). Pursuant to
mail cover, however, any second, third, or fourth class mail may be opened and examined
without a search warrant. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 168 n.1 (9th Cir.), cerL
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
47. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(g)(4) (1986).
48. Id. at § 233.3(g)(4)-(5).
49. J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.1(a) (1986).
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515-2518 (1968).
51. Id.
52. J. CARR, supra note 49, at § 3.3(a).
53. Id.
54. The pen register is defined as:
A device connected to a telephone instrument or line that permits the recording of
telephone numbers dialed from a particular telephone instrument. "Pen register"
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The pen register is installed at a central telephone facility,55 and records
all numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses
created by dialing the phone. 6 The pen register also records the time a
call is placed and the number of rings at the telephone number dialed.5
7
It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether
the calls are actually completed. 8 Government use of the pen register is
regulated: agents must provide the telephone company with reasonable
grounds for using the pen register,59 and the surveillance may last for
thirty days,60 after which an extension may be granted.61
Two additional electronic techniques provide surveillance similar to
that of the pen register: a diode device and a dialed number recorder. In
contrast to a pen register's list of outgoing calls, a diode reveals informa-
tion from incoming phone calls-the phone numbers of those who dial
into a suspect's telephone.62 The dialed number recorder provides infor-
mation from both incoming and outgoing telephone communications:
the numbers dialed out of a suspect's phone, the origin of incoming calls,
and the duration of calls.63 No explicit procedure regulates governmen-
tal use of diodes or dialed number recorders, but courts have held that
the pen register procedure controls governmental installation of these
devices." 4
These techniques-mail search, mail cover, wiretapping, examining
toll records, pen register, diode, and dialed number recorder-are tools
which supply government agents with the technical capacity to monitor
communications. Raw technical ability, however, is circumscribed by
constitutional limits, and the availability of each technique depends on its
categorization under the Fourth Amendment.
also includes decoder devices used to record the numbers dialed from a touch-tone
telephone. "Pen register" does not include equipment used to record the numbers
dialed and duration of long-distance telephone calls when the equipment is used to
make such records for an entire telephone system and for billing or communications
management purposes.
32 C.F.R. § 42.6(h) (1986).
55. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
56. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 32 C.F.R. § 42.7(b) (1986).
60. Id. at § 42.7 (a)(1)(iv)(2).
61. Id.
62. J. CARR, supra note 49, at § 3.2(c)(2)(C).
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
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III. Fourth Amendment Restraints on Governmental
Monitoring of Communications
The ease with which a specific procedure may be applied to monitor
communication depends on whether the activity comprises a governmen-
tal search under the Fourth Amendment.65 This determination serves to
identify the limits on procedures used by police to collect data. If the
procedure is a search, it is permissible only pursuant to a valid search
warrant issued by a judicial magistrate upon a proper display of probable
cause and descriptive detail.66 A procedure which is not a search, but
rather a surveillance, is available to law enforcement agents without judi-
cial supervision or approval. If an electronic mail cover is to be permit-
ted without a search warrant, its procedure must be carefully defined to
avoid being judicially labelled as a search. Of critical importance, there-
fore, is to identify the analysis courts use in distinguishing search from
surveillance, and extend it to proposals for electronic mail cover. An un-
derstanding of this analysis begins with a survey of the constitutional
principles derived from the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Historical Purpose and Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.67
The Framers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights
largely because of perceived abuses of the "writs of assistance" used by
colonial officials in Massachusetts. 68 A writ allowed colonial officials to
search a suspect's home for smuggled goods. 69 The English Parliament
65. See infra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A few governmental actions are deemed to be searches, but
nonetheless permitted without search warrants in strictly defined circumstances. One signifi-
cant example is the power of police to "frisk," or carry out a superficial search for weapons on
the person of a suspect. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Another exception to the warrant
requirement is a search incident to arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Addi-
tionally, objects in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in that position of view may be
seized and introduced into evidence without a search warrant. Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968). A warrantless search may be sustained where the court finds it to have been
impossible or unwise to first obtain a warrant. This is the "exigent circumstances" exception,
and it applies in cases where police are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, or where evidence is likely
to be destroyed prior to obtaining a search warrant. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 647-48
n.c (5th ed. 1891).
69. Id. at 649.
approved the writs, which permitted general searches unrestricted in
scope.70 In addition, prior to 1763, 71 colonial officials could acquire gen-
eral arrest warrants which authorized apprehension of unnamed and un-
described suspects.72 To curtail the inherent abuse of writs of assistance
and general warrants, the Framers desired an explicit proscription of
general searches and arrests, and codified that desire in the Fourth
Amendment.73
The original purposes of the Fourth Amendment-to inhibit abusive
police practices and to proscribe governmental intrusion into the inner
recesses of an individual's life74 -have endured uncompromised by dra-
matic social changes in the United States over the course of two centu-
ries. In contrast, the scope of the Fourth Amendment has proven to be
vulnerable to mercurial influences, such as changing mores and idiosyn-
cratic judicial analyses. For example, a basic tenet of the Fourth Amend-
ment-protection against indiscriminate and unreasonable police
searches-remains resolute, while opinions on how to achieve this policy
fluctuate. This flux reflects judicial ambivalence in identifying which in-
terests are guarded by the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court
accommodates this ambivalence by redefining the term "search." When
it recasts the definition of search, the Court revises the scope of the
Fourth Amendment, because a governmental activity which is not a
search is not caught within the Fourth Amendment's protective web.
Significant to developing a procedure for electronic mail cover, therefore,
is to incorporate restrictions which prevent its electronic surveillance
from becoming an electronic search. Ascertaining appropriate restric-
tions for electronic mail surveillance entails understanding the current
definition of search, as historically derived from cases which have influ-
enced the Fourth Amendment's scope.
B. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment Today:
The Definition of Search
One of the earliest decisions of significance in deriving the current
definition of a search was Boyd v. United States.75 The Court in Boyd
designated property interests as the beneficiaries of fourth amendment
protection: a government surveillance which did not infringe an individ-
ual's property interest was not a search and could be implemented with-
out a search warrant.76 Numerous subsequent Court decisions relied on
70. Id. at 648-50.
71. In 1763, the use of general arrest warrants was judicially disapproved. Id. at 649.
72. Id. at 650.
73. A. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW § 240 (1985).
74. P. DIONISOPOULOS & C. DUCAT, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY: ESSAYS AND CASES 15
(1976).
75. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
76. Id. at 627.
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the Boyd analysis.77 Of particular note are two cases in which the Court
considered the fourth amendment status of electronic eavesdropping.
The first of the two, Olmstead v. United States,7" held that a wiretap
which had not physically intruded upon the defendant's premises was
not a search because "the Constitution does not forbid [wiretapping] un-
less it involves actual unlawful entry into a house."7 9 The Boyd physical
intrusion requirement disqualified the surreptitious Olmstead wiretap as
a search, and electronic eavesdropping accomplished without physical in-
trusion required no search warrant.
Conversely, applying Boyd to hidden microphone eavesdropping in
Silverman v. United States,8" the Court concluded that a search had oc-
curred because a microphone used by the police had been placed in an
outside wall of the defendant's premises.81 The Boyd test of physical in-
trusion was met by the Silverman microphone which had physically in-
truded upon a protected area-the defendant's premises-and therefore
comprised a search constrained by the warrant requirement.8 2 This ves-
tige of Boyd-that the Fourth Amendment protected only interests with
physical dimension-survived until the Court "discarded fictional and
procedural barriers rested on property concepts" in Warden v. Hayden.3
Shortly after Warden, the Supreme Court bestowed further judicial
insight as to the elusive definition of a "search." In Katz v. United
States,84 law enforcement agents suspected the defendant of violating a
federal statute85 by using a telephone to transmit illegal bets. The de-
fendant habitually used a particular phone booth, and government agents
placed a wiretap on the outside of the phone booth to record the defend-
ant's conversations in the booth. The agents had not obtained a search
warrant prior to the wiretapping, and in his appeal to the Supreme
Court, the defendant alleged that application of the wiretap constituted a
governmental search, allowable only pursuant to a valid search warrant.
The Court agreed with the defendant's assertion, holding that a search
does not require a physical intrusion because "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."8 6 Katz completely reformulated the scope
of the Fourth Amendment: while incorporating Warden to extend the
Fourth Amendment's scope beyond physical interests, Katz denied
77. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585 (1904).
78. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
79. Id. at 452.
80. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
81. Id. at 512.
82. Id.
83. 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
84. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976).
86. 389 U.S. at 351.
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fourth amendment protection to "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office."
87
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz,88 composed a
two-part analysis to determine when a surveillance becomes a search
which is restricted by the warrant requirement. First, the person sub-
jected to the alleged search must have actually expected her interest to be
treated by others as if it were private.89 Second, if the subject did harbor
such an expectation of privacy, her expectation must have been objec-
tively reasonable.9" Justice Harlan's formulation has provided courts
with a paradigm for determining whether a governmental activity com-
prises a fourth amendment search. The consistency with which cases
since Katz have invoked Harlan's two-part test is testimony to its endur-
ance as a practicable standard.91 The paradigm may thus be summa-
rized: a governmental procedure is a search if it intrudes on an interest
which the suspect actually and reasonably expected to be treated by
others as private92 to the suspect. If the suspect harbored no conscious
expectation of privacy as to the infringed interest, or if the suspect's ex-
pectation of privacy was not reasonable, then the interest is not protected
under the Fourth Amendment, and any governmental intrusion on the
interest does not comprise a fourth amendment search.93 This analysis is
invoked by courts to examine the constitutionality of particular govern-
mental procedure, 94 and a consensus from these holdings will illuminate
the constitutional status of electronic mail cover.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. "In determining whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveil-
lance is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz." Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12
(1978); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1982).
92. A different privacy analysis is used by Justice Douglas to identify a constitutional
"right to privacy" for individuals. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 486 (1965).
Griswold's "right to privacy," derived from six constitutional Amendments, id. at 484-85, is
not interchangeable with Katz's "zone of privacy," 389 U.S. at 350-51, which derives from the
Fourth Amendment. Although the right to privacy is the fundamental interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment, id. at 351, "[t]he Fourth Amendment cannot be equated with a gen-
eral right to privacy, since Fourth Amendment protections extend beyond privacy interests."
Id. at 350. See also Brock, 667 F.2d at 1319 n.7; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 359 (1974).
93. See Note, The Impact of Smith v. Maryland on the Law of Pen Registers, I ANTIOCH
L.J. 65, 70-71 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Pen Registers].
94. See infra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
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IV. Methods of Monitoring Communications
Without a Search Warrant
A. Pen Registers and Tracing Devices
In United States v. New York Telephone Co., the Supreme Court
held that a pen register does not violate the Fourth Amendment because
it is not a search. The Court explained this conclusion by noting that
only insignificant information is revealed by the pen register:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from
the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These
devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone num-
bers that have been dialed-a means of establishing communica-
tion. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call
was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.9 6
The information obtained by the pen register was sufficiently trivial to
disqualify it from any reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus did not
comprise an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment under the sec-
ond part of the Katz test.
New York Telephone emphasized the distinction between the means
of communication, which law enforcement agents may monitor without
a warrant, and the constitutionally protected purport of a communica-
tion. The Court in Smith v. Maryland97 found this distinction equally
compelling. In Smith, the Court held that installation and use of a pen
register at a telephone company's office to record numbers dialed by the
defendant was not a search and violated no expectation of privacy.9" The
Court distinguished the pen register from a wiretap, 99 which records the
substance of a communication."° The pen register gathered only "non-
substantive" information, to which no objective expectation of privacy
attached.10 1 Therefore, the pen register did not intrude on a protected
private area under the Katz test and was not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 1 2 Another factor which influenced the
Smith holding was that the defendant voluntarily disclosed phone num-
bers he dialed to the phone company whenever he dialed a phone
number.'0 3 Voluntary disclosure"° precluded recognition of any reason-
95. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
96. Id. at 167.
97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
98. Id. at 745-46.
99. A wiretap intercepts the communication transmitted over the telephone wires, and
may not be applied by law enforcement agents without a search warrant. J. CARR, supra note
49, at § 1.1(a).
100. 442 U.S. at 741.
101. Id. at 743-45.
102. Id. at 745-46.
103. Id. at 743-44.
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able expectation of privacy with regard to those numbers.
Unlike the federally regulated pen register procedure, 10 5 a govern-
mental procedure for installing a diode device, or trace, to record num-
bers from incoming phone calls has not been defined. But the judicial
analysis of this technique employs the pen register analysis:
[T]he same rules applicable to pen registers also control the instal-
lation of other mechanical or electrical devices designed to trace
incoming calls. The equipment used in tracing phone calls is simi-
lar to a pen register in that it does not accomplish an "aural acqui-
sition" within the meaning of [the Safe Streets Act]. Traces, like
pen registers, neither hear nor monitor contents. 106
Furthermore, the dialed number recorder, distinguished from the pen
register by its capacity to trace both incoming and outgoing calls, never-
theless acquires no "contents" of conversation, and is therein analogous
to the pen register for purposes of procedural guidance. 1
0 7
B. Mail Cover
The Supreme Court has declined to consider the constitutionality of
the mail cover.10 8 Its refusal to address the issue, however, is attributed
to the similarity between the mail cover and the pen register under a
fourth amendment search analysis. 0 9 Federal courts which have ruled
on the mail cover consistently invoke the Supreme Court's analysis of the
pen register as set forth by New York Telephone and Smith." 0 In
Vreeken v. Davis,"' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
constitutionality of mail cover, analogizing mail cover to the pen register.
The court found the pen register analysis from Smith to be
determinative:
104. The Court contended that an individual who voluntarily conveys numerical informa-
tion to the phone company assumes the risk that the company would reveal the information to
the police. Id. at 744. But Justice Marshall, in dissent, provides a compelling argument criti-
cizing the legitimacy of the "voluntary disclosure" rationale: "[Unless a person is prepared to
forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a
practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative." Id. at 750 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
105. The pen register is defined in 32 C.F.R. § 42 (1986). See supra notes 54-61 and ac-
companying text.
106. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1977).
107. State v. Miller, 449 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
108. See, eg., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978); United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976);
United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976);
United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
109. See, eg., Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Choate, 576 F.2d at 175-77.
110. See, eg., cases cited supra notes 108-109.
111. 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1983).
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[T]he mail cover at issue in the instant case is indistinguishable in
any important respect from the pen register at issue in Smith. The
mail cover did not include an examination of the contents of any
mail .... Courts that have addressed the question have uniformly
upheld the constitutionality of mail covers on this reasoning.112
The mail cover in Vreeken did not disturb the letters' contents, but re-
vealed only nonsubstantive information which could be granted no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. The Vreeken court thus concluded that
the Supreme Court decision in Smith compelled a holding that mail
cover was not a search and its use did not violate the fourth amendment
warrant requirement.1 13
The Ninth Circuit considered the mail cover in United States v.
Choate.11 4 The opinion relied on the Katz privacy formulation,11 5 and
found no reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to the envelope of
a letter: "[L]ike any other reasonable citizen, [the defendant] could ex-
pect no privacy as to the outside of his incoming mail, . . . [the] 'lack of
privacy' is not significant enough to be constitutionally impermissible
when [mail cover] does not concern the substance of a communication
and fits within regulatory restrictions."" 6 The information voluntarily
supplied on an envelope is not protected by the Fourth Amendment be-
cause no justifiable expectation of privacy exists for envelope
information. 1 7
Judicial analyses of mail cover, pen register, and tracing devices
have concluded that those procedures do not intrude on fourth amend-
ment interests because they reveal only voluntarily submitted informa-
tion as to the means of a communication. 8  The means of a
communication is not substantive information, and surveillance of that
information by law enforcement agents is not within the ambit of fourth
amendment protection. 19 Repeated judicial emphases distinguish the
112. Id. at 347-48.
113. Id. at 348.
114. 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
115. Id. at 174-75.
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. at 176-77.
118. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-45; New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 166-67;
Vreeken, 718 F.2d at 347-48; Choate, 576 F.2d at 177.
119. The dissents in Choate, 576 F.2d at 201-02 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), and Smith, 442
U.S. at 747-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting), criticized the wisdom of this leniency. The criticisms
are reiterated by commentators who have examined the holdings in those cases. See Note,
Mail Covers and the Fourth Amendment: United States v. Choate, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 201,
209-16 (Dec. 1978); Note, Pen Registers, supra note 93, at 68-76; see also Note, Invasion of
Privacy: Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 165, 170 (1978) (in
which the author promulgates abolition of a procedure permitting mail surveillance without a
search warrant). These analyses persuasively criticize the judicial refusal to categorize the pen
register and mail cover as fourth amendment searches requiring search warrants. But one com-
mentator suggests that permitting such procedures without search warrants actually safe-
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content of a communication-substantive information-from the means
of a communication-logistical information."' 0 The means of communi-
cation, but not the content, may be monitored without a search warrant,
because logistical information merits no fourth amendment protection,
and governmental examination of logistical data is therefore not a search.
Whether a governmental monitoring is a search thus pivots on determin-
ing whether the procedure reveals the content of a communication to law
enforcement agents.
V. Governmental Surveillance of Electronic Mail
A. The Importance of a Procedure for Electronic Mail Cover
By monitoring a suspect's electronically sent messages, law enforce-
ment agents might acquire information useful in efforts to ferret out
crime.121 Existing technology provides the capability to monitor elec-
tronic mail, but no procedure applies to prohibit the abuses indigenous to
electronic surveillance methods.12 The legislative reluctance to provide
the needed procedure portends undesirable results, such as police misuse
of electronic mail cover, which is judicially countered with excessive re-
straint. Faced with a flagrant governmental abuse of unregulated elec-
tronic mail surveillance, an alarmed court might respond by attaching a
warrant requirement to any form of electronic mail surveillance. This
result would eradicate what might have been a useful and inoffensive po-
lice procedure under proper regulation.
Legislative neglect in regulating electronic mail cover and the lack
of judicial precedent in this area force inquiries on the law of electronic
mail cover to draw principles from scattered but comparable surveillance
procedures. This Note relies on such an approach to formulate proposals
for regulating electronic mail cover. Two procedures are needed to ac-
guards the privacy of the contents of communications. If the showing of cause for a pen
register is the same as that required for a wiretap, governmental agents would always request
the more information-laden wiretap. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 28
(1978). Professor Fishman argues that civil liberties and privacy are less vulnerable when a
pen register is permitted without a search warrant because the availability of the pen register
may discourage governmental monitoring of the contents of a conversation, when surveillance
of the means of the conversation would suffice for the particular law enforcement objective at
hand. Id. If an electronic mail cover is to resemble a pen register, see infra text accompanying
notes 127-136, Professor Fishman's argument merits consideration by those who would re-
quire a search warrant for its installation.
120. The courts apply various labels to differentiate the information which comprises the
"content" of a communication from that which reflects the "means." The category of informa-
tion deriving from the content or purport of a communication is labelled "substantive," "pri-
vate," or "personal." The category of information which reflects the means of communication
is labelled "nonsubstantive," "commercial," or "logistical." These terms are used interchange-
ably throughout this Note.
121. See Webster, supra note 11, at 353, 364.
122. Landever, supra note 40, at 600.
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commodate the alternative methods of sending electronic mail. The first
procedure supplies surveillance of mail which is sent directly from com-
puter to computer. The second technique applies to the surveillance of
letters which are sent through an electronic mail agency. The best means
of implementing surveillance differs for the two forms of electronic mail.
B. A Proposal for Covering Directly Transmitted Electronic Mail
Attempted surveillance of electronic mail which is transmitted di-
rectly between two computers, independently of an electronic mail inter-
mediary, threatens to lay bare the contents of the entire communication
because nothing in the transmission separates content from logistical in-
formation-the mail is simply sent from one computer to another, over
telephone lines. To extract "envelope information"-identities of sender
and recipient, time, date, origin, and destination-from a direct transmis-
sion would entail interception of the entire transmission and expose its
content. This interception would not provide an acceptable mail cover
because the judicial refusal to extend fourth amendment protection to
information acquired through ordinary mail cover is premised on the
mail cover's disclosure of only the means of communication, not the con-
tent. 123 Electronic mail cover which intercepted the content of commu-
nication would resemble a wiretap's interception of spoken telephone
conversation, which is not available without a search warrant.12 4
The possibility of using a wiretap to effect electronic mail cover is
further derogated by recent congressional legislation. The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986125 amended the wiretap law126 to
protect electronically transmitted nonvocal messages in the same manner
as telephone conversations are protected. The amendment requires gov-
ernment agents to obtain a search warrant before using a wiretap to in-
tercept the content of an electronic message. This requirement sensibly
updates the wiretap law to protect the content of the phone call, whether
the content is electronically sent text or spoken conversation.
1. The Pen Register as Prototype
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits electronic
mail surveillance from acquiring any information-even ostensibly "en-
velope" information-from the electronic transmission itself. The source
of envelope information for direct electronic mail must be found else-
where. The only logistical trail created by directly transmitted electronic
mail is the telephone number used by a correspondent to transmit the
123. See Vreeken, 718 F.2d at 347-48; Choate, 576 F.2d at 177-78; see also supra notes 111-
117 and accompanying text.
124. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515-2518 (1968).
125. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (pamphlet 10).
126. See supra note 124.
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message over phone lines. The pen register is thus an appropriate model
for an electronic mail cover of terminal-to-terminal correspondence
which is not a search. The surveillance provided by a pen register in the
context of electronic mail is no different from the pen register used in the
context of telephone communications. Consequently, the judicial analy-
sis of the pen register which permits its installation without a search war-
rant 127 may be extended to allow pen register surveillance of the phone
numbers dialed by a computer modem without a search warrant.
2. Suggested Restrictions
A lurking concern with using the pen register as a model for cover-
ing direct electronic mail is that data obtained through the pen register
and conventional mail cover are conceptually opposite. By disclosing in-
formation from envelopes addressed to a suspect, manual mail cover pro-
vides government agents with information as to a suspect's incoming
correspondence. Manual mail cover surveillance thus identifies the send-
ers of communication to a suspect. In contrast, a pen register records the
phone numbers dialed from a suspect's telephone and provides govern-
ment agents with information as to a suspect's outgoing phone calls. Pen
register surveillance thus identifies the intended recipients of communica-
tion from a suspect. This concern should not prove constitutionally
problematic, to this electronic mail cover, though, since Fourth amend-
ment principles applicable to pen registers have been extended to diode
devices which trace the origin of incoming phone calls. 28 Since it reveals
phone numbers of those who call the suspect's telephone, the diode de-
vice is analogous to mail cover in that both procedures acquire data from
communication directed to a suspect. The diode device does not collect
any substantive information, and may be installed by law enforcement
agents without a search warrant.1 29 Additionally, the dialed number re-
corder, which records information from both incoming and outgoing tel-
ephone communications,13 0 does not intercept a communication and
therefore is not subjected to the search warrant requirement.1 31 These
holdings indicate that surveillance of communication may acquire logisti-
cal information from both parties involved; the direction of communica-
tion is not of constitutional import.
Three devices-pen register, diode, and dialed number recorder-
are able to elicit logistical information that comprises the relevant "en-
velope" data for terminal-to-terminal electronic mail. Consequently, this
electronic mail cover procedure may take three forms: (1) surveillance of
127. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 741-42.
128. J. CARR, supra note 49, at § 3.2(c)(2)(C).
129. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1977).
130. J. CARR, supra note 49, at § 3.2(c)(2)(C).
131. State v. Miller, 449 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
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outgoing phone numbers dialed by a computer modem via the pen regis-
ter; (2) surveillance of incoming calls received by a modem via the diode;
and (3) two-way surveillance of a modem's activity via the dialed number
recorder. A reasonable approach is to draft a procedure which permits
electronic mail cover by means of any one of the three devices, while
requiring the requesting agent to specify which form of surveillance is
most appropriate for the law enforcement objective at hand.
Additional restrictions on an electronic mail cover which is pat-
terned after the pen register should reflect restraints imposed by the pen
register procedure. The specifications which limit the duration of pen
register surveillance and require law enforcement agents to provide rea-
sonable cause for the pen register serve to safeguard the procedure's con-
stitutionality. Pen register surveillance over an unlimited length of time
might be sufficiently intrusive so as to garner fourth amendment protec-
tion. 1 32 A procedure for surveillance of electronic mail by means of a
pen register should include similar provisions limiting duration and
availability so that it does not invade fourth amendment interests.1 33
3. Phone Company Compliance
Successful surveillance by means of a pen register requires coopera-
tion from the telephone company which provides the suspect's phone ser-
vice. The extent to which a phone company may be forced to cooperate
in pen register surveillance has been litigated and resolved in the govern-
ment's favor: the phone company must comply because "[t]he assistance
of the phone company... [is] essential to the fulfillment of the purpose
for which the pen register... [is] ordered. Without the company's assist-
ance, pen registers cannot be effectively employed."1 34 A court may also
require a phone company to provide its toll records when the law en-
forcement agent needs to examine a record of long distance calls previ-
ously made by the suspect.13 5 Although an unwilling phone company
may be forced to comply, it is not forced to pay: where the company is
compelled to assist with the installation of a pen register, it stands to be
reimbursed for the expenses incurred.136
C. A Proposal for Covering Indirectly Transmitted Electronic Mail
In contrast with transmitting electronic mail directly over phone
lines to another computer, routing a message through an electronic mail
132. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
133. The procedural restrictions placed on the pen register are discussed supra notes 59-61
and accompanying text.
134. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. at 175-76.
135. See Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593
F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); see also J. CARR, supra note 49,
at § 3.3(a).
136. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 389.
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agency in a sense cleanses the trail left by the communication because the
message is sent to the recipient indirectly. No direct logistical link be-
trays the communication because a correspondent who subscribes to a
mail agency does not dial the recipient's phone number, and the sender's
modem does not access the recipient's phone line. Applying a pen regis-
ter to monitor indirectly transmitted electronic mail would not reveal the
phone numbers of intended recipients, but rather the phone number of a
mail service's host computer. Despite its utility in covering directly
transmitted electronic mail, the pen register fails as a model for covering
mail sent through an electronic mail service because phone numbers be-
tween senders and mail companies, or between mail companies and re-
cipients, contain little useful information.
L Covering Electronic Mail Sent by Agency: Access
to Commercial Records
The source of information which sustains manual mail cover surveil-
lance is the display provided by a letter's envelope. Comparable to that
display is the data examined by surveillance of direct electronic mail by
means of pen register recordation of the phone numbers dialed among
communicating computers. But a surveillance of indirect electronic
mail, sent through an agency, requires a different source of envelope in-
formation. The presence of a third party-an electronic mail agency-
will provide the source needed for covering indirect electronic mail. The
appropriate form of this surveillance is access to the information from a
company's commercial records of transactions with its customers. The
propriety of permitting governmental access to commercial records with-
out search warrants has been debated in a variety of contexts: the con-
sensus is that law enforcement agents are not required to obtain search
warrants prior to obtaining information from commercial records.
1 37
These holdings emphasize that business records are not sufficiently pri-
vate or personal in nature to be protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The commercial information compiled by electronic mail agencies is suf-
ficiently similar to the information sought in these cases to permit law
137. See, eg., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (the public interest in regulating danger-
ous drugs outweighs any individual privacy interest in reporting all prescriptions to the state
since no personal, private business, or political confidences are involved; these reports may be
obtained by law enforcement agents without a search warrant); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 401, 414 (1976) (tax documents are not "private papers" and may be examined by
law enforcement agents without search warrants); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 35, 52-53 (1974) (individual bank depositors have no fourth amendment interest in bank
records and copies of their bank accounts-such records and copies may be examined by law
enforcement agents without search warrants); Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 512-13
(Iowa), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983) (public libraries must make their circulation records
available to law enforcement agents without search warrants).
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enforcement agents access to electronic mail records without a search
warrant.
2. Suggested Restrictions
If electronic mail cover of indirectly transmitted mail is to be ef-
fected by governmental access to a mail company's commercial records,
it will be important to define the permissible extent of that access. A
mail company may record much more than "envelope" information. Re-
liability is crucial to a mail service that receives and transmits electronic
data. Meticulous and detailed record-keeping by the company indicates
reliability to customers, provides evidence in case of dispute with a cus-
tomer, facilitates accuracy in billing customers, and establishes a general
database of information for use by the company. Furthermore, because
of the vulnerability of electronic data to loss or damage within the com-
puter, an electronic mail company might adopt a policy of duplicating
and storing all correspondence that it handles. To permit police unlim-
ited access to a mail company's records on a suspected customer might
impermissibly broaden the scope of surveillance. To protect the integrity
of this electronic mail cover as a nonsubstantive surveillance, its proce-
dure should explicitly limit governmental access to proper logistical in-
formation-time and date, length, and destination of transmission-and
explicitly forbid examination of additional commercial or substantive
data. In addition, this electronic mail cover should be procedurally lim-
ited in duration, reflecting limits placed on manual mail cover surveil-
lance.138 A procedure which permits sufficiently restricted access to
information from a mail company's commercial files will provide a work-
able and constitutional mail cover for indirectly transmitted electronic
mail, and will be available to law enforcement agents without a search
warrant.
3. Electronic Mail Company Compliance
Conventional mail cover gathers data from a public agency: the
United States Postal Service. In contrast, all electronic mail services cur-
rently in operation are private. The Federal Postal Service withdrew
from electronic mail enterprise after a failed attempt to enter the elec-
tronic mail market. 39 Successful mail cover of correspondence sent via
private electronic mail agencies will require assistance and cooperation
from the companies in supplying the necessary information from their
138. The procedural restrictions placed on manual mail cover are discussed supra notes 45-
48 and accompanying text.
139. The United States Postal Service briefly dabbled in electronic mail by developing a
system called "E-COM," but it dropped that project in 1984. See Computer Mail Effort Aban-
doned, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at D15, col. 1; see also I. MAYER, supra note 3, at 65. The
problems confronting the Postal Service in undertaking an electronic mail delivery system are
discussed in L. TRUDELL, supra note 2, at 136-37.
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records. Assistance and cooperation may not be forthcoming, however,
from a private company likely to resent the intrusion, inconvenience,
and cost of such surveillance. The extent to which a private company
may be forced to assist government agents in mail surveillance is thus
critical to this form of electronic mail cover.
This issue will be resolved in the government's favor: court ordered
compliance is a common technique used to counter a private company's
reluctance to cooperate with a governmental surveillance.1" ° The status
of the third party as a private, rather than public, entity does not affect
judicial authority to compel compliance with law enforcement agents in
the fair administration of justice. 141 A variety of private companies-
pharmacies, 4 2 banks, 43 and libraries'4---have been judicially ordered to
aid law enforcement surveillance. These cases provide abundant prece-
dent for compelling an electronic mail service to assist government
agents by supplying the pertinent information for covering indirectly
transmitted electronic mail.
140. "'[The citizenry may be called upon to enforce the justice of the state... with
whatever implements and facilities are convenient and at hand.'" New York Telephone, 434
U.S. at 175-76 n.24 (quoting Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 17, 164 N.E. 726,
727 (1928)).
141. "The conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to law enforce-
ment officials when it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions." Id.
142. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
143. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
144. Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983). The
surveillance of library patrons' reading habits poses concerns similar to those of governmental
surveillance of electronic mail. Most major metropolitan libraries have converted their circu-
lation records from cumbersome manual card check-out procedures to on-line recordation of
circulation. Computerized circulation records facilitate the investigation of library records
and invite the gaze of researchers, who may want to derive statistics on reading habits, as well
as law enforcement agents, who may want to examine a suspect's reading choices. Prior to the
computerization of library circulation records, such investigations were impractical; now com-
puterized records provide potentially fertile databases for administering these investigations.
Whether such investigations are searches requiring a warrant is an issue which remains largely
unaddressed.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Brown v. Johnston found that fourth amendment protections
do not extend to library circulation records, and held that the protection of circulation records
from governmental surveillance is outweighed by the state interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Id. at 512-13. The court acknowledged the potential chilling effect of un-
hampered or indiscriminate government searches of circulation records, writing that "[tihe
effect of forced disclosure of library records would be to chill citizens' reading of ... books
because others might learn of it... and any such inquiry would invade their fourth amend-
ment zone of privacy." Id. at 512. See Comment, Brown v. Johnston The Unexamined Issue
of Privacy in Public Library Circulation Records in Iowa, 69 IowA L. REv. 535, 539 (1984).
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VI. Future Electronic Mail Cover: A Cause for Reevaluating
the Search vs. Surveillance Paradigm
Courts have consistently exempted mail cover and pen register sur-
veillance from the search warrant requirement because the techniques
reveal no content of communication.' 45 The holdings indicate that sur-
veillance of electronic mail which reveals only the means of its commu-
nication would not evoke judicial imposition of the warrant requirement.
Appropriately restrictive regulation of electronic mail cover, therefore,
will place electronic mail cover in the array of other methods used to
monitor the means of communication-manual mail cover, pen register,
and similar procedures-which dwell safely outside the perimeter of the
Fourth Amendment. But an increasing reliance on electronic communi-
cations will entail a reconsideration of the principles which currently de-
limit fourth amendment protection.
A. The Problem with Katz's Subjective Requirement
The Katz formula-that an individual must subjectively and reason-
ably expect privacy as to information about her before the Fourth
Amendment will require police to obtain a search warrant prior to col-
lecting that information14 6-- remains fundamental to courts in determin-
ing whether a governmental procedure is sufficiently intrusive to
comprise a search.147 But requiring an individual consciously to desire
privacy with regard to an interest before that interest begets constitu-
tional protection fails to serve fourth amendment purposes in an era of
electronic surveillance.
The heart of electronic surveillance is covertness. Justice Brennan
has noted that "the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack
of notice to the suspect."' * Electronic acquisition of data is particularly
insidious when its subject has voluntarily disclosed desired information.
But disclosure would likely be less voluntary if the discloser were ap-
prised of the usefulness of volunteered information as a surveillance de-
vice for law enforcement agents. The impropriety of relying on individual
subjective expectations to ascertain fourth amendment protection is ex-
emplified by electronic mail surveillance. Many electronic mail users
may remain unaware of the vulnerability of the records of their commu-
nications to investigative agents. Posting a letter conventionally, a corre-
spondent is likely to understand the logistics of transportation, and to
145. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register); United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (pen register); Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.
1983) (mail cover); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978) (mail cover).
146. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
147. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
148. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J, dissenting).
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realize that postal workers will handle the mail between mailboxes. In
contrast, electronic delivery and its technological machinations are much
less comprehensible to the average electronic mail user. 49 Additionally,
agencies may store copies of electronic messages to protect against liabil-
ity for loss or damage to messages, and the electronic correspondent may
not know when electronic duplicates of letters are retained by the com-
pany. Company policies and practices which are unknown to subscrib-
ers, coupled with the technical complexity of electronic transmissions,
suggest that it is inappropriate to require an electronic mail user con-
sciously to construct an explicit expectation of privacy with regard to
electronic correspondence.
B. Electronic Surveillance: Logistical Information Takes
on Substantive Proportions
Electronic enhancement of techniques which monitor the means of
communication portends a disturbing expansion in the power of ostensi-
bly "nonsubstantive" surveillances. Courts have emphasized that elec-
tronic recording is entirely different from manual recording. In Lopez v.
United States,150 Justice Brennan indicated the problems inimical to elec-
tronic surveillance:
[T]here is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance
... and conventional police stratagems such as eavesdropping and
disguise. The latter do not so seriously intrude upon the right of
privacy.... But as soon as electronic surveillance comes into play,
the risk changes crucially. There is no security from that kind of
eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a
residuum of true privacy."'
The opposing view contends that technological improvement alone
cannot affect the fourth amendment analysis of a surveillance technique.
Technology has upgraded various manual surveillance techniques with-
out changing the type of data acquired. For example, the use of an elec-
tronic tracking device, known as a beeper, facilitates the tracking of a
suspect's movements. In theory, the same record could be compiled by
physically following the suspect. An electronic surveillance which only
improves the ability to accumulate data that could be compiled manually
does not affect fourth amendment analyses. This reasoning appealed to
the Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts,'52 in which the use of a
beeper by police without a warrant was upheld. The Court held that
"scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which
149. For a discussion of the general lack of knowledge of how the systems work, see I.
MAYER, supra note 3, at 11.
150. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
151. Id. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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visual surveillance would not also raise." '153 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals followed this rationale in United States v. Brock, 5 4 holding that
since a beeper was a "mere sense enhancement technique," its use did not
transform the physical tracking of a suspect into a search.'55 Technolog-
ical upgrading renders surveillance techniques more efficient,1 56 but no
constitutional violation necessarily occurs from an increase in the effi-
ciency of otherwise constitutional surveillance procedures.
These analyses are persuasive, but fail to recognize that the onus of
electronic surveillance lies in an increased capacity for governmental ac-
quisition of information, not simply a greater efficiency in doing so.1 57
As technological sophistication grows, Justice Brennan's concern in Lo-
pez-that electronic enhancement may sufficiently transform a manual
technique so as to require new constitutional analysisI 58-- becomes in-
creasingly persuasive. The Ninth Circuit's Brock opinion qualifies its
own holding, conceding that "[a]t some point, the amount and specificity
of the information revealed and the duration of the monitoring would
require the use of the particular sense enhancement device to be charac-
terized as a search." 159 Moreover, Justice Stevens, concurring with the
majority in Knotts, emphasized that although it may be possible to use
sense enhancing techniques without invoking the Fourth Amendment,
"it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection techniques
does not implicate especially sensitive concerns."160
Blanket constitutional endorsement of "mere sense enhancement" of
surveillance techniques disregards the ramifications of an enormous in-
crease in the amount of information made possible by such sense en-
hancement. The ramifications are depicted vividly by Justice Douglas in
California Bankers Association v. Shultz. 6' Justice Douglas criticized
the analysis which allows electronic devices to escalate the government's
surveillance capacity without simultaneously increasing the restraints
placed on those techniques. 62 Focusing solely on information contained
on one's checks, he portrayed the potential for misusing conglomerations
of data:
In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examin-
ing them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors,
political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational
153. Id. at 285.
154. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
155. Id. at 1322.
156. Landever, supra note 40, at 602-03.
157. The increased capacity is reflected by the explosion in the amount of information
obtainable by means of skillful access to computer networks. Id. at 598-99.
158. 373 U.S. at 449-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. 667 F.2d at 1322.
160. 460 U.S. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
162. Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infin-
itum.... Now that we have the data banks, these other items will
enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat-by
pushing one button-to get in an instant the names of the 190 mil-
lion Americans who are subversives or potential and likely
candidates. 163
C. Electronic Mail Cover: Where Does the Search Begin?
The courts have acknowledged that at some point an enormous
amount of seemingly trivial, voluntarily relinquished information, accu-
mulated by means of electronic recording, sufficiently resembles a search
so as to be restricted by the warrant requirement.' 64 The controversy
generated by electronic mail cover is not that it is faster or easier than
manual mail cover, but that it is more powerful: the breadth of informa-
tion available increases significantly as more communications are trans-
mitted electronically. 165 Technology renders surveillance more efficient
by improving the mechanics of the techniques. Operating in tandem
with increased efficiency, however, is an increase in power brought to
such techniques by electronics. The technological trend toward centrali-
zation of commercial and private transactions166 completed from a home
or business computer portends an electronic mail cover which potentially
will reveal political affiliations, 6 7 mail order purchases, I6 8 tax and
bill payments, 169 memoranda, travel plans, job application re-
163. Id.
164. Justice Douglas has opined that all forms of wiretapping, bugging, and electronic sur-
veillance sufficiently resemble searches so as to offend the Fourth Amendment. Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 62 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
165. For effectively dour depictions of the use and abuse of electronically stored data, see J.
WICKLEIN, ELECTRONIC NIGHTMARE 11-12, 195-98 (1981). One potential misuse of an in-
crease in power is the governmental cross referencing of electronically stored data. Also
called computer matching, this process accesses various discrete information banks to accom-
plish such tasks as profiling specific persons, ferreting out tax fraud, and discerning the misuse
of government funds. For a discussion of the pending threat posed by this commingling of
information, see Kirchener, Privacy: A History of Computer Matching in the Federal Govern-
ment, COMPUTER WORLD, June 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
166. The "intelligent telephone" symbolizes the impending centralization of banking, shop-
ping, and information services. The Greater New York Savings Bank offers one such service:
a subscriber may complete credit card and banking transactions, and obtain stock quotations
and voice libraries of recorded information, by pushing the appropriate buttons on her tele-
phone. Baer, Telecommunications Technology in the 1980's, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR To-
MORROW, supra note 23, at 84-85. For further discussion of centralized information services,
see Landever, supra note 40, at 605-07.
167. The potential to transmit electronically requests for political information, to commu-
nicate electronically with political representatives, and to receive political literature via elec-
tronic mail is depicted in J. DEKEN, supra note 27, at 324-25.
168. Deken also discusses electronic purchasing. See id. at 322-23.
169. Transmitting tax information electronically is discussed in Gerofsky, supra note 3, at
309-10 n.31.
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quests,170 and membership records. 171 The ability to cross-tabulate and
analyze electronically stored information could reveal an alarmingly ac-
curate profile of an individual. 172
Emphasizing that interpretation of fourth amendment protections
must be a dynamic process, the Brock court wrote that "[a]daptation of
Fourth Amendment values and jurisprudence to the electronic age into
which we are rapidly moving presents a challenge with which this nation
will be concerned for some time to come." 173 This challenge is posed by
electronic mail cover: when electronic surveillance techniques, which
are unrestricted by the warrant requirement, begin to acquire dispositive,
revealing bodies of facts, recategorizing the techniques as searches will be
essential. Although proper restrictive codification may enable electronic
mail cover to exist unfettered by fourth amendment restrictions, a judi-
cial awareness for the abuse of an electronic mail cover must check its
development. The emphatic distinction between substance and logistics
of communication becomes less meaningful as methods for gathering and
analyzing nonsubstantive information grow in sophistication. As elec-
tronic mail becomes increasingly integrated into American society, 174 ju-
dicial willingness to reevaluate the paradigm which may currently
exempt electronic mail cover from the Fourth Amendment would curb
the emergence of an ever-present governmental gaze.
Conclusion
A proposal for developing electronic mail cover which surveys elec-
tronic communication requires resolution of several constitutional issues.
Procedurally, care must be taken to ensure the electronic mail cover
reveals only nonsubstantive, envelope-like data. This may be accom-
plished by modeling electronic mail cover after existing and comparable
surveillance procedures. As electronic mail becomes an increasingly
prevalent means of communication, the ability of electronic mail cover
to collect and convey large, cohesive amounts of "nonsubstantive" data
170. Id.
171. These and other data are obtainable pursuant to the manual mail cover. See Choate,
576 F.2d at 201 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). The emergence of electronic mail suggests that
these data will be obtainable through electronic mail cover.
172. See, e.g., What Your Wallet Reveals About You, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 7, 1984,
at A16, col. 1, for an exposition of the mounds of personal data retrievable by applying cursory
information-i.e., voter registration and driver's license number-to access more privileged
information stored in computer databases.
173. 667 F.2d at 1318.
174. Electronic mail grew successfully from 1980 through 1985, with the number of
messages transmitted doubling every year. It is predicted that by the end of the decade, the
number of electronic messages transmitted annually will have reached 10 billion. That number
will exceed 40 billion by 1995, according to forecasts compiled by the Office of Technology




will inevitably emerge. Reevaluation of the constitutional categorization
of electronic mail cover will then be crucial. The reams of electronic
communications networks which span the country leave information-
laden trails and bestow a tempting tool to be used by investigative and
law enforcement agencies. The power of this device is enormous, and if
improperly plied, ominous.
In a society whose interstices are increasingly transparent, it is es-
sential to protect electronically stored data more stringently than tangi-
ble records. One evocative comparison emphasizes this: "Orwell's thesis
was surveillance, which was used to impose Big Brother's will on people.
At the time, Orwell could only see the use of microphones and television;
the surveillance in 1984 was done clumsily. But now surveillance is done
simply by monitoring the flow of information." '175 The "microphones
and television" of 1984 have matured into the adroit and surreptitious
techniques of 1987. Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment must paral-
lel this metamorphosis to ensure that such techniques are not cloaked in
legitimacy by an absence of Orwellian "clumsiness."
By C. Leigh Haynes*
175. Fear of Filing: A Computer-Age Dilemma, Chicago Reader, July 22, 1983, at 4, col. 2
(interview with George Trubow).
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